A Difficult Fight
By Obajoseph Michael
Since Crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria on January 15, 1956, at Oloibiri, a small community in present-day Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta region, the history of Nigeria has never been the same. That historic discovery made by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (then operating as Shell-D’Arcy) after over 70 years of intermittent exploration has left the Niger Delta region as the goose that lay the golden egg.
Though early exploratory work actually began when the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation started test drilling in 1908 but in 1938 Shell-D’Arcy received an exclusive exploratory license covering the entire country. That was when in January 15, 1956: Commercial oil was struck at Oloibiri Well 1 but it was not until1958 that regular production and the first crude oil exports from the Oloibiri field began thus launching Nigeria into the global petroleum market.
Curiously, after over 70 years of Commercial oil discovery at Oloibiri Well 1, the Data regarding crude oil exploration exists only with SPDC(Shell) and NUPRC( formerly known as DPR). Even then, experts say what happens from the exploration points to the crude oil loading terminals, can only be better described as a mirage. It got worse when the nation’s three refineries could no longer refine petroleum products. That was when stealing of crude oil and vandalisation of crude oil pipelines and oil wells became rampant. Before the nation could say Jack Robinson, persons who engage in crude oil theft for sales in the international market using a cartel and those who steal the crude oil to refine in small local refineries took over the center stage. It became so bad that even the Nigerian Navy has not been able to confront the crude oil thieves to the fullest.
In 2022, the Federal Government engaged, a private security company to complement the work of the country’s security agencies in protecting oil infrastructure hence Tantita Security Services Nigeria Limited,was awarded the pipeline surveillance contract at N48 billion annually or about N4 billion a month. The contract is believed to cover parts of Delta, Ondo, Imo and Rivers states and some areas of Bayelsa. The contract is straightforward, as Tantita was expected to put people who understand the creeks and communities on the ground, combine their local knowledge of the coverage areas with surveillance and intelligence, and then help government protect the nation’s critical oil infrastructure. This is aside the deployment of security agencies like the Nigerian Navy, Civil Defence etc.
Though, the private surveillance of oil pipelines contract, the fight against crude oil theft and pipeline vandalism, their efforts have contributed to a sharp rise in Nigeria’s crude production even then crude oil vessels are still being arrested abroad and traced to Nigeria.
For instance in December 2025, the US Coast Guard and Navy intercepted a supertanker Skipper on suspicions of crude oil theft and equally linked the supertanker to money-laundering networks. The supertanker with capacity to carry up to 2.2 million barrels of crude oil was reportedly owned and managed by Nigeria-based Thomarose Global Ventures Ltd. But, Thomas Mackistosh the owner of the company later told the US authority that his Company had no hand in anything coming from Nigeria. What that means was that a cartel with link in Nigeria facilitated the alleged crude oil theft. But the Nigeria government though Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA distanced the country’s official registry from the ship. Curiously too in 2022 there was the incident of MV Heroic Idun. A massive 3-million-barrel-capacity oil tanker that was detained by authorities in Equatorial Guinea after attempting to illegally load Nigerian crude without authorization and evading naval patrol. The vessel and its crew were later handed back to Nigeria for legal proceedings.
Within the West African sub region investigations by bodies like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Chatham House have tracked stolen Nigerian crude moving via ship-to-ship transfers to neighboring West African countries (such as Ghana, Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire) as well as global destinations including Singapore, China, and the United States.
The magazine gathered that crude oil theft Syndicates use Ship-to-Ship Transfers in international waters or poorly monitored gulfs to illegally siphoned crude before it enters formal commercial shipping lines.
As for the Transnational Syndicates, officials of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) has emphasized that oil theft relies heavily on cross-border criminal networks that exploit security gaps across Africa to launder proceeds and move illicit cargo globally.
Only recently, precisely on July 23, 2026, naval personnel intercepted MT FILIA at the Utue Terminal in Akwa Ibom State and arrested its 12 crew members. The Navy said the vessel was allegedly siphoning crude from an oil well terminal jacket.
Earlier investigations, according to the Navy, showed that MT FILIA was carrying about 650 metric tons of crude oil and 32.82 metric tons of fuel oil without the required documentation or lawful authorization. The vessel and its cargo were taken into custody while investigations continued. The arrest came under Operation DELTA SENTINEL, the Navy’s current campaign against crude-oil theft and related crimes.
Between April and June 2026 alone, the Navy has recovered more than 4.7 million liters of petroleum products, dismantled more than 58 illegal refining sites, destroyed 239 dugout pits and 13 refining ovens, and arrested more than 91 suspects connected with crude oil theft.
Though, the Navy said Nigeria’s crude production had risen to 1.89 million barrels per day in July, above the country’s OPEC quota but the obvious fact is that oil theft has refused to stop. That itself raises a question as to why criminals are still able to reach the country’s crude despite pipeline surveillance contract where private companies are paid to help protect the country’s oil infrastructure. Though recently, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and the Nigerian Navy renewed their strategic partnership with the endorsement of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to strengthen maritime security, enhance safety and deepen coordinated enforcement across Nigeria’s maritime domain.
This is important and necessary because some time in October 2022, Tantita operatives uncovered illegal connections around the Trans-Escravos and Trans-Forcados pipeline systems in Delta State. One illegal connection was reportedly located less than a kilometre from a military security post. That discovery revealed something important about the nature of the problem. Oil theft is not simply a matter of people sneaking into remote creeks with small boats. Some operations of the oil theives involve pipelines, illegal connections, loading points, barges and vessels. In other words, the theft could involve an entire chain, and that chain has proven difficult to break.
Also in January 2024, Tantita and other security agencies seized MT Kali in Bayelsa State. Twenty crew members and accomplices were arrested after the vessel was accused of siphoning crude from the Pennington oil field operated by Shell Petroleum Development Company. The Federal Government subsequently secured an interim forfeiture order over the vessel. What happened to the 20 crew members and owner of the vessel?
Less than a month later, another vessel entered the record. MT Harbor Spirit was intercepted in February 2024 after security operatives alleged that it was stealing crude from the Sengana oil field in the coastal area of Bayelsa. The Federal Government also obtained an interim forfeiture order concerning the vessel and its contents.
Tantita itself announced another interception that same month. The company said its operatives, working with the military, arrested MT Harbor Spirit while it was loading crude at the Segana oil field. Tantita estimated that the vessel had about 80,000 litres of suspected stolen products on board. These cases matter because they demonstrate that surveillance can detect and disrupt theft. But they also demonstrate that, even after the surveillance system was strengthened, vessels were still reaching oil producing areas and attempting to load crude illegally. The arrests therefore did not mean the problem had disappeared. They meant that the problem of oil thefts had become visible enough to be intercepted. The public record also contains incidents that are harder to place neatly in either the success or failure column.
One of the most notable for example occurred in December 2023, when the Nigerian Navy arrested a 77-metre tanker with 17 crew members over alleged crude-oil theft in the Ondo area. The Navy subsequently alleged that Tantita could be connected to the illegal activity because the area around Awoye was covered by the company’s surveillance operations. Tantita rejected the allegation and called the Navy’s statement false and defamatory. The company also said it had raised an alarm over the arrest and claimed there had been a disagreement between its personnel and naval officers over access to the vessel. There is an important lesson in that dispute. The oil theft fight is not being conducted by one organisation. The Navy has its constitutional responsibilities. The Army operates in the region. The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps has a role. NNPCL has its own surveillance and command systems. Oil companies have their own security arrangements. Private contractors such as Tantita also operate within the wider architecture. The result is a security system with many actors. That can be useful when they cooperate. It can also create friction when responsibilities overlap.
A similar controversy emerged in August 2023 around MT PRAISEL, a vessel that Tantita intercepted after it left a jetty carrying High Pour Fuel Oil.
A published account of the incident alleged that the vessel had valid permits and that laboratory tests later confirmed that its cargo was HPFO rather than crude oil. The allegations included claims of forceful boarding and harassment by Tantita personnel. Those claims were made in a critical account of the incident and should not be confused with an established finding against the company.The episode nevertheless raised a practical question; where does pipeline surveillance end and maritime law enforcement begin?
That question matters because a security contractor can identify suspicious activity, but the arrest, investigation, testing, prosecution and eventual conviction of suspects involve government institutions.
Stopping a tanker is only one part of the process. What happens after the tanker is stopped is another. The wider record shows that oil theft continues across areas and infrastructure covered by several security arrangements.
In September 2024, NNPCL said 302 oil theft and pipeline vandalism incidents had been identified across the Niger Delta in one week from information supplied by multiple sources, including Tantita, Shell, Pipeline Infrastructure Nigeria Limited, Oando, Heirs Energies, NNPCL’s command centre and government security agencies.
In another report covering a week in 2023, NNPCL recorded 149 oil theft incidents across the Niger Delta. The numbers point to a problem that is much larger than the performance of one contractor.
Also in June 2026, NNPCL disclosed that 24 cases of pipeline theft had been recorded across its network since 2025; 19 in 2025 and five more in 2026 at the time of the disclosure. The company was investigating a vandalised section of the NNPC crude oil pipeline at Pai in the Federal Capital Territory.
NNPCL also disclosed a particularly unusual development that suspected criminals had allegedly disguised themselves as members of a Federal Government task force while stealing sections of pipeline infrastructure. About nine kilometres of pipeline had reportedly been stolen along the Warri-Kaduna crude oil pipeline corridor since 2025.That detail says something about the changing nature of the threat. The criminals are not necessarily standing beside a pipeline with a wrench waiting for security personnel to leave. Some networks appear capable of organising people, equipment, transport and false identities. And that is where the limits of surveillance become clearer. A surveillance company can discover an illegal connection. It can report a suspicious vessel. It can help security agencies arrest suspects. But the larger oil-theft economy involves more than the physical act of stealing crude. There has to be someone willing to buy it. There have to be people who move it. There have to be places where it can be stored, processed or transferred. There have to be vessels capable of transporting it. And there have to be financial channels through which the proceeds can move.
NNPCL’s chief executive, Bayo Ojulari, said in August 2025 that the theft problem involved sophisticated international syndicates exploiting weaknesses in national and regional security systems. At the time, he said pipeline and terminal receipts had improved to close to 100 per cent, compared with a period three years earlier when as little as 30 per cent of oil sent through some pipelines reached export terminals. That statement is important because it shows that improved security and continuing theft can exist at the same time. A system can become much better without becoming perfect. Nigeria may be losing less oil today than it did at the height of the crisis while criminals continue to steal oil. That distinction is often lost in the public debate. The Niger Delta remains an unusually difficult environment to secure. It is a vast network of creeks, rivers, mangroves, swamps and waterways. Oil infrastructure is spread across difficult terrain, including locations that are difficult to reach by road. That geography has always complicated surveillance. It also means that securing one pipeline does not necessarily secure the network around it. A thief who cannot access one route can look for another. The 2024 arrest of MT Harbor Spirit illustrates this shift. Tantita’s own operations executive said the company believed some perpetrators had moved toward maritime routes after pressure on land operations. That is not proof that every thief has adopted the same strategy but it shows why the fight keeps changing. As security improves in one area, criminal operators have an incentive to look for another. The latest MT FILIA case brings the story back to where it began. The Navy says it used intelligence and surveillance to identify the vessel and intercept it. Between April and June 2026, it says its operations resulted in the recovery of more than 2.31 million litres of stolen crude oil, alongside millions of litres of other petroleum products. It also reported 580 operational missions, the interception of three motor tankers and 11 boats, and the discovery of illegal wellheads and pipeline connections. These are not signs of a security system doing nothing. They are signs of a security system actively finding criminal activity. But they also show that the criminal activity remains active. That is the central tension in Nigeria’s oil theft story.
On one side are rising production figures, successful arrests and claims that pipeline losses have fallen sharply. On the other are vessels such as MT FILIA, illegal refineries, dugout pits, pipeline breaches and fresh arrests. Both realities can be true. There are those who say the improved production figures are evidence that the arrangement is working. There are others who point to continuing theft and ask whether the country should be satisfied with catching thieves after they have reached the oil. Both arguments deserve to be examined against the facts. There is also another point that deserves attention. There is no reliable public scorecard showing every attempted theft within Tantita’s area of responsibility, every incident it detected, every incident it failed to detect, every arrest that followed, every case that reached court and every case that resulted in conviction. Without such a scorecard, it is difficult for the public to make a precise judgment about the company’s performance. That is not the same as saying Tantita has failed. It is saying that accountability requires measurable standards. If the Federal Government is paying billions of naira for pipeline surveillance, Nigerians should be able to see, in clear terms, what the contract has achieved. How many kilometres of pipeline are being monitored? How many incidents were detected? How quickly were they detected? How many suspects were handed over to government agencies? How many cases went to court? How many resulted in convictions? How much crude was recovered? And, perhaps most importantly, how much crude that should have reached Nigeria’s terminals actually failed to get there? Those questions should not be answered by press releases alone. They should be answered with records. The company has uncovered illegal connections and helped intercept vessels. The Navy has carried out its own arrests and seizures. The Army, police, NSCDC, NNPCL and oil companies have also recorded massive operations. At the same time, theft and vandalism have continued. That points to a deeper problem.
Nigeria has spent considerable effort improving detection and interception. But the full chain of oil theft extends beyond the pipelines. There is the question of who finances the operations. There is the question of who buys stolen crude. There is the question of how stolen crude is moved. There is the question of what happens to suspects after arrest. Does investigation reveal the real thief that send the suspect to steal the crude oil? And there is the question of whether prosecutions and convictions are strong enough to make the business unattractive. Those are not questions a surveillance contractor can answer alone. They require the police, prosecutors, courts, regulators, intelligence agencies, the Navy, the Army, NNPCL and the oil companies to work as parts of one system. The evidence of recent years suggests that Nigeria is getting better at finding oil thieves. The harder question is whether it is getting equally good at dismantling the networks that make the theft profitable. That distinction matters. Because if one tanker is seized, another can be brought in. If one illegal refinery is destroyed, another can be built. If one pipeline connection is removed, another can be installed somewhere else. And if the people carrying out the theft are arrested but the financiers, buyers and wider networks (the big thief behind the scene) remain untouched, the business can survive.
Four years after the Federal Government brought Tantita and other private security companies into the pipeline-surveillance system, Nigeria’s oil sector is clearly in a different place from the depths of the production crisis. Production has improved, security operations have intensified, thousands of illegal structures and facilities have been attacked over time, Vessels have been seized. Suspects have been arrested. Yet the latest Navy operation shows that crude theft has not disappeared. MT FILIA was not a historical relic from Nigeria’s worst years. It was intercepted in July 2026. That is the uncomfortable part of the story. The question is no longer simply whether Tantita is working or whether the Navy is working. It is whether the entire security and enforcement system is working well enough to make oil theft a bad business. Because Nigeria can continue to celebrate every vessel seized, every illegal refinery destroyed and every suspect arrested. But until the criminal networks (the big thief hiding behind the scene) that keep finding ways into the country’s oil wealth are broken, one question will keep returning; After four years of surveillance, billions of naira spent and countless arrests and seizures, what will it finally take to make stealing Nigeria’s crude oil no longer worth the risk?
Will the recently signed MoU at the Nigerian Navy Headquarters, Abuja, and the Director General of NIMASA, Dr Dayo Mobereola, and the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Idi Abbas marks a significant milestone in the longstanding relationship between both institutions?
The agreement provides a framework for enhanced collaboration in the promotion and maintenance of maritime security and the effective implementation of the Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences (SPOMO) Act, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and other relevant maritime laws and regulations within NIMASA’s mandate.
Can NNPCL sign a similar MOU with the Navy, Army and NSCDC to make sure all the crude oil that leaves the pipelines reach the export terminals? Equally worrisome is why the main sponsors of bunkering in the creeks are not being arrested? They are equally like the big thieves behind the scenes. Until the major sponsors are arrested jailed and the properties they acquired from the crude oil theft recovered, the fight against crude oil theft will remain a mirage.